Strait of Hormuz Monitor
Strait of Hormuz Closure — Live Impact & Worst-Case Scenario
The strait has been closed or severely restricted for 80+ days. This page quantifies (a) the shortfall happening right now and (b) the worst-case if the remaining transit also stops. Numbers update with live throughput, bypass-pipeline capacity, and OFAC vessel coverage. The price bands are honest historical analogs (1990 Iraq invasion +60%, 2019 Aramco strike +20%) — not forecasts.
What this page is and isn't
What it is: a quantified read on the ongoing Hormuz disruption — the shortfall already stranded by the current closure plus the worst-case if remaining flows stop — using the same modeling inputs the EIA and IEA publish. The headline numbers — ~20 Mbpd normal throughput, ~7 Mbpd bypass capacity, $2-3/bbl premium per 1 Mbpd shortfall — are widely cited in their World Oil Transit Chokepoints series.
What it isn't:a forecast. Actual price response depends on duration of closure, OPEC spare capacity release, strategic-reserve coordination, and demand destruction from sustained high prices. The “shock factor” we apply (2.5x the rule-of-thumb) is a historical analog — the 1990 Iraq invasion spiked Brent 60% in 2 months; the 2019 Aramco strike added 20% on a single day before easing.
Why bypass pipelines aren't enough
Saudi East-West (Petroline, 5 Mbpd) and UAE ADCOP (1.5 Mbpd) combined can absorb only ~7 Mbpd vs the ~20 Mbpd that normally transits the strait. The remaining ~13 Mbpd has no physical escape route until Iran allows transit again or capacity is added (years of construction). See /pipelines for live utilization.
Peer chokepoints — for context
Live throughput from the Hormuz Monitor strait-status classifier (AIS vessel-transit counts). Strategic reserve estimates from IEA Monthly Oil Market Report. Country exposure from EIA crude-import disaggregation. Updated as the underlying inputs change — full methodology at /methodology.