Strait of Hormuz LNG: Qatari Exports and Global Gas Supply
Qatari LNG exports are at severe risk: the Strait of Hormuz is severely restricted, roughly day 154 of the disruption that began 28 Feb 2026. About 20% of the world's LNG normally transits here, and unlike crude oil there is no pipeline that can carry it around the strait — a liquefied cargo either sails through Hormuz or it does not reach market.
As of . Strait verdict anchored to IMF PortWatch satellite transit data; terminal activity from live AIS.
The numbers behind the answer
Why LNG is more trapped than oil
Most coverage of the Strait of Hormuz focuses on crude, but LNG is the cargo with the least room to manoeuvre. Roughly a fifth of the world's liquefied natural gas normally passes through the strait, and almost all of it is Qatari, loaded at Ras Laffan — the largest LNG export facility on earth at about 77 million tonnes per year.
Crude oil has partial escape routes. Saudi Arabia can push barrels west through the East-West (Petroline) pipeline to Yanbu on the Red Sea, and the UAE can route crude to Fujairah, outside the strait, via ADCOP. Together those lines offer several million barrels a day of bypass capacity. Qatar has no equivalent for gas. LNG must be chilled to liquid at the terminal and carried in a purpose-built vessel; it cannot be sent through an oil pipeline, and no gas export pipeline runs from Qatar around the strait. A cargo either sails through Hormuz or it does not reach the market.
That asymmetry is why LNG shipping through the strait has fallen further than crude shipping during this crisis. It also means the impact is felt globally rather than regionally: Qatar's buyers are in Asia and Europe, so the shortfall lands on JKM and TTFspot gas prices and on utilities replacing gas-fired generation, not on Gulf domestic supply. Replacement is slow by nature — new liquefaction capacity takes years to commission, so there is no fast supply response the way there can be with crude drawdowns from strategic reserves.
One caveat on the live figures: AIS transponder data is self-reported, and vessels operating in the area routinely switch transponders off. Terminal vessel counts should be read as a lower bound on activity, and the headline strait verdict is anchored to IMF PortWatch satellite data rather than AIS for exactly that reason.